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Case No. 20100246-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
Patricia Salazar Houston, 
Defendant/ Appellee. 
Brief of Appellant 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The State appeals from a pretrial order of dismissal entered following the 
suppression of all of the State's evidence. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008), and Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(3)(b) 
(West Supp. 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The trial court granted Defendant's motion to suppress the State's evidence, 
finding no reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of Defendant's car. 
Issue 1. Does this Court have jurisdiction to hear the State's appeal of the 
subsequent pre-trial order of dismissal without prejudice, which order fails to 
expressly provide that the prosecution's case was substantially impaired by the 
suppression of evidence? 
Standard of Review. "Whether this court has jurisdiction presents a question of 
law that we review for correctness." State v. Cashing, 2004 UT App 73, f 10,88 P.3d 
368; see also Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, Tf 8,31 P.3d 1147. 
Issue 2. Did the trial court err in ruling that the stop of Defendant was not 
supported by a reasonable suspicion that she was driving on a suspended or 
revoked license? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress is a mixed question of law and fact. See State v. Morris, 2009 UT App 181, 
f 5,214 P.3d 883. The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially 
for correctness, including its application of the legal standard to the facts. See State 
v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, \ 8,147 P.3d 425; State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f f 11,15,103 
P.3d 699; Salt Lake City v. Bench, 2008 UT App 30, If 5,177 P.3d 655. The underlying 
factual findings are reviewed for clear error. See State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, f 11, 
100 P.3d 1222; Bench, 2008 UT App 30,1 5. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions and cases are relevant to a 
determination of this appeal and are attached in Addendum A: 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV; 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l (West Supp. 2009). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 8,2008, Deputy Avery Stewart was investigating a retail theft 
claim at a Macey's store in Providence, Utah, when he stopped to talk with off-duty 
Trooper Phil Rawlinson outside the store's entrance. R. 142:13, 22. During their 
conversation, Trooper Ralinson saw Defendant driving an automobile out of the 
parking lot. R. 142:12-14. 
Trooper Rawlinson recognized Defendant on sight because of his repeated 
involvement with her over the previous couple of years. R. 142:7-14. He had 
assisted in arresting her for DUI in 2006. R. 142:7. Shortly thereafter, he again 
arrested her for DUI and learned by running a computer check that her driver's 
license had been revoked until the year 2012. R. 142:8, 10. Subsequently, he 
observed her driving twice within a couple of days of each other and issued her two 
citations for driving on a revoked license. R. 142:9-12. In the process of printing the 
first citation, he again ran a computer check and reaffirmed that her license was still 
revoked. R. 142:12. Finally, two or three days prior to his November 8 sighting of 
Defendant, Trooper Rawlinson took advantage of an opportunity to check the status 
of Defendant's license while at the Driver's License Division, again confirming that 
her license remained revoked. R. 142:14-15. 
When Defendant drove by the two officers, Trooper Rawlinson pointed her 
out to Deputy Stewart, identified her by name, and told him that her license was 
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revoked due to alcohol. R. 142:14,17,23. Relying on the information provided by 
Trooper Rawlinson, Deputy Stewart followed Defendant and stopped her.1 R. 
142:23-24. 
The deputy smelled alcohol on Defendant when he approached the driver's 
window. R. 124. He asked if her license was revoked, and Defendant admitted that 
it was. Id. Deputy Stewart noticed that Defendant's speech was slow and slurred 
and that she had bloodshot, glossy eyes. Id. However, she denied having had any 
alcohol. Id. Defendant performed poorly on almost all of the field sobriety tests, 
and she refused to take the intoxilizer. R. 124-25. The deputy arrested her and 
impounded her car. R. 125. During the subsequent inventory of the car, officers 
found an open container of alcohol in Defendant's purse. Id. 
Once at the jail, Defendant agreed to the intoxilyzer only after being told that 
a warrant for a blood draw could be obtained. Id. She provided an insufficient 
breath sample, however, resulting in an incomplete reading that put her breath 
volume at .0164 liters and her breath alcohol content at .127. R. 125. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged Defendant with driving under the influence ["DUI"], a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502 (West Supp. 2009); 
1
 The deputy could not remember whether he contacted dispatch to verify the 
status of Defendant's license before stopping her. R. 142:26. Regardless, he did not 
receive any additional information prior to stopping Defendant. R. 142:26-27. 
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being in actual physical control (with priors), a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502; driving on a suspended or revoked license (alcohol 
related), a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227(3) (a) 
(West Supp. 2010); and having an open container in her vehicle, a class C 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-526(3) (West Supp. 2009). R. 
3-5. Following a preliminary hearing, Defendant was bound over. R. 61-62. 
Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress, seeking suppression of 
"all evidence in this matter/' and arguing that: (1) the intoxilyzer test was invalid 
due to the use of an insufficient sample; (2) the arresting officer lacked reasonable 
suspicion for a Level II stop where he failed to corroborate the statements from a 
fellow officer before relying on them to stop her; and (3) the open container of 
"alcohol" was inadmissible because it was seized without a warrant, the contents 
were never tested, and the beverage was not identified. R. 74-75, 76-102. A few 
days later, Defendant filed a motion in limine seeking exclusion of all mention of any 
prior DUI-related arrest, incarceration, or conviction. R. 109-14. 
The State responded to both motions, and both were argued at a motion 
hearing on February 16,2010. R. 120-34,135-36. The State presented the testimony 
of both Deputy Stewart and Trooper Rawlinson. R. 135. Following argument, the 
trial judge granted Defendant's motion to suppress, finding that the arresting officer 
lacked reasonable suspicion to justify his stop of Defendant. See id.; R. 142:33-37 
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(verbal ruling is attached hereto as Addendum B). At the court's invitation, the 
State moved to dismiss the case without prejudice, and the court granted the 
motion. R. 135,137-38; R. 142:36-37. The written order was entered on February 16, 
2010, and the State timely appealed. R. 137-40. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Issue I. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal because it arises from a 
final appealable pre-trial order from which the State has a statutory right to appeal. 
The State is appealing "a pretrial order dismissing a charge on the ground that the 
court's suppression of evidence has substantially impaired the prosecution's case[.]" 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(3)(b) (West Supp. 2009). This statutory provision 
supersedes the judicially-imposed requirements set forth in State v. Troyer, 866 P.2d 
528 (Utah 1993), which augmented the previous version of section 77-18a-l by 
requiring that the dismissal be with prejudice and that the trial court certify that the 
suppression of evidence substantially impaired the State's case. See id. at 530-32. 
Where the trial court and defense counsel below agreed that the suppression of the 
evidence left the State unable to proceed with its case, the order of dismissal was a 
final appealable order under the present version of section 77-18a-l(3)(b) even 
though it was made without prejudice. 
Issue II. The trial court's suppression ruling warrants reversal because it runs 
contrary to settled law. The trial judge suppressed the evidence because the 
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arresting officer himself did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. 
However, the law provides that when an officer stops a vehicle based on 
information he receives from other law enforcement sources, the validity of the stop 
rests on whether the source of the information possessed a reasonable suspicion 
justifying the stop. Because Trooper Rawlinson had reasonable suspicion to believe 
that Defendant was driving on a revoked license, the subsequent stop of the car by 
Deputy Stewart pursuant to information he received from Trooper Rawlinson was 
justified by reasonable suspicion. Hence, there was no basis upon which to 
suppress the evidence found pursuant to that stop, and this Court should reverse 
the lower court's contrary decision. 
ARGUMENT 
L 
THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL 
BECAUSE IT ARISES FROM A FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER 
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN- § 77-18A-l 
Prior to submitting her opening brief, Defendant moved to dismiss this 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. She argued that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l and State v. Troyer, 866 P.2d 528 
(Utah 1993), because the trial court neither certified that suppression of the evidence 
"substantially impair[ed] the prosecution's case" nor dismissed the case "with 
prejudice[,]" both of which are required by Troyer. Memorandum in Support of 
7 
Motion [for] Dismissal of Appeal at 2-4 (quoting Troyer, 866 P.2d at 531). Following 
receipt of the State's opposing memorandum, this Court denied the motion and 
deferred a ruling on the jurisdictional issue "pending plenary presentation and 
consideration of the case/' Order dated May 14,2010 (attached in Addendum C). 
Jurisdiction rests in this Court because the present statute requires only that 
suppression of the evidence "substantially impair[]" the State's case, and both the 
court and defense counsel below recognized that suppression of the evidence in this 
case prevented the State from proceeding further on the charges. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18a-l(3)(b) (WestSupp. 2009). 
A, This Court has Jurisdiction Under the Present Statute 
Defendant's motion rested on State v. Troyer, 866 P.2d 528 (Utah 1993). In that 
case, the Utah Supreme Court imposed two requirements before the prosecution 
could appeal from a dismissal following pretrial suppression of evidence: (1) that 
"the trial court certif[y] that the evidence suppressed substantially impairs the 
prosecution's case"; and (2) that the State's request for dismissal be "with 
prejudice." Id. at 531. On appeal here, Defendant contends that the appeal is 
improper because neither Troyer condition was satisfied in this case. Defendant's 
reliance on Troyer is misplaced. 
When Troyer was decided, section 77-18a-l simply and broadly provided that 
"[a]n appeal may be taken by the prosecution from . . . a final judgment of 
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dismissal/' Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (Supp. 1990); Troyer, 866 P.2d at 529. 
The statute did not specifically address dismissals pursuant to the State's motion 
following a suppression order. Troyer recognized that the State should be able to 
appeal from such a dismissal, but felt a need to judicially restrict such appeals by 
means of the "certification" and "with prejudice" conditions to prevent a prosecutor 
from manipulating the statute to circumvent the interlocutory appeal process. 
Troyer, 866 P.2d at 530-31. In short, Troyer created judicially-imposed requirements 
that spoke to concerns not addressed by the broadly-worded statute then in 
existence. 
Since issuance of Troyer, section 77-18a-l has been amended to better define 
the circumstances under which the prosecution may appeal as a matter of right The 
amendment specifically includes appeals from a dismissal following an order 
suppressing evidence: 
(3) The prosecution may, as a matter of right, appeal from: 
(b) a pretrial order dismissing a charge on the ground that the court's 
suppression of evidence has substantially impaired the prosecution's 
case; 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(3)(b) (West Supp. 2009). Thus, under the current statute 
governing appeals, the only requirement imposed by the Legislature for appealing a 
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dismissal following a suppression order is that the dismissal be "on the ground that 
the court's suppression of evidence has substantially impaired the prosecution's 
case." Id. The revised statute more directly addresses the situation and concerns 
presented in Troyer than did its predecessor, while at the same time rejecting the 
need for the additional safeguards of a formal certification and dismissal without 
prejudice. Indeed, the statutory requirement of substantial impairment of the State's 
case significantly narrows the prosecutor' ability to appeal "'from virtually every 
adverse pretrial order'" or pretrial suppression order. See Troyer, 866 P.2d at 530-31 
(quoting State v. Waddoups, 712 P.2d 223, 224 (Utah 1985)); see also State v. Gushing, 
2004 UT App 73, \ 13, 88 P.3d 368, cert, granted, 90 P.3d 1041 (Utah 2004).2 The 
amended statute supersedes Troyer, and its requirement is met in this case. 
Here, the trial court did not state in its written order the reason for the 
dismissal, nor did the prosecutor identify the grounds upon which the motion to 
dismiss was made. R. 137-38. However, a review of the record reveals that the 
dismissal was in fact "on the ground that the [trial] court's suppression of evidence. 
. . substantially impaired the prosecution's case." See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-
l(3)(b). 
2
 Certiorari was granted to direct removal of unnecessary language from the 
court of appeals' decision. 
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After stopping Defendant on suspicion of driving on a revoked license, the 
sheriffs deputy gathered evidence that Defendant was intoxicated and ultimately 
arrested her for DUI. Defendant moved to suppress "all evidence" gathered 
following the traffic stop, arguing that the stop was invalid at its inception. R. 74-75. 
Defense counsel expressly recognized in arguing for suppression that absent 
reasonable suspicion to support the stop, "everything beyond that point is 
suppressed, and that leaves the State without a case." R. 142:29 (emphasis added). He 
then acknowledged the State's concern for its ability to proceed without the 
evidence, stating,"... to argue that this guts their case just is not relevant. It does, but 
I guess in a way, that's too bad." Id. (emphasis added). The trial court granted 
Defendant's suppression motion, recognizing that it effectively left the State without 
evidence to proceed and suggesting that dismissal of the charges was in order for 
that reason: 
THE COURT: Now, having said that, just housekeeping. I don't 
know much about you [Defendant] or about your cases other than 
what I've heard in this case here, but it's obvious you have a serious 
problem. You are being - [the prosecution] can chose [sic] how they 
want to proceed from here but I don't see how they can proceed 
without the information from the stop. 
I'm begging you, just - you're going to hurt yourself or you're 
going to hurt somebody else. (Inaudible). 
Mr. McAdams? 
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MR. MCADAMS: At this time the State moves to dismiss 
without prejudice, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. So with that the court is in recess. 
MR. BUNDERSON: And dismissed. The record will show the 
case is dismissed? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
R. 142:33, 36 (emphasis added). The record thus demonstrates that the "pretrial 
order dismissing [the] chargefs]" was "on the ground that the court's suppression of 
evidence has substantially impaired the prosecution's case[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 77-
18a-l(3)(b). Accordingly, the statutory requirement is met, and this Court has 
jurisdiction over the State's appeal in this case. See id. 
B. Even under Troyer, this Court has Jurisdiction Over this Appeal 
Assuming Troyer remains good law, it does not require dismissal of this 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. This Court has determined that Troyer "does not 
require rigid, mechanical application" of its requirements. Cushing, 2004 UT App 
73, Tf 17. It requires only "sufficient indicia" that dismissal was based on substantial 
impairment of the State's case. See id. (" jurisdiction is conferred upon an appellate 
court pursuant to a final appealable order [of dismissal following a grant of a 
pretrial motion to suppress evidence] if it has sufficient indicia of substantial 
impairment to the State's case."). 
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"Sufficient indicia" exists in this case where the court and both parties 
recognized the devastating effect of the challenged ruling on the State's case. 
Further, as the Troyer court explained, certification would give the defendant "a 
chance to object before the dismissal is entered while still permitting review by the 
appellate court." Troyer, 866 P.2d at 531. Here, Defendant had ample opportunity 
to object, failed to do so, and, instead, expressly recognized that the ruling would 
"leave[] the State without a case." R. 142:29. Requiring that this obvious fact be 
reduced to writing before the State may appeal the ruling would be to elevate form 
over substance. See Troyer, 866 P.2d at 531-32 (refusing to remand the case for the 
necessary certification because it was "undisputed that the cumulative effect of the 
suppression orders left the prosecution unable to proceed."). Where the record is 
clear that the suppression of all evidence arising after the traffic stop substantially 
impaired the State's case, there is "sufficient indicia of substantial impairment" so as 
to confer jurisdiction on this Court. See Gushing, 2004 UT App 73, f 17. 
Similarly, there is "sufficient indicia" of the State's inability to re-file the 
charges to render dismissal with prejudice unnecessary. Troyer imposed the 
requirement of dismissal with prejudice as a "further safeguard" against the refiling 
of the charges by the State following affirmance of a suppression decision on appeal. 
See Troyer, 866 P.2d at 531. This added protection already exists under the 
circumstances at hand, despite the dismissal without prejudice. All of the evidence 
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pertaining to three of the four charges was obtained from the stop. There is nothing 
to suggest that any additional evidence exists to support the offenses. Upon 
affirmance of the lower court's suppression ruling, the entirety of that evidence will 
be unavailable to the State, leaving nothing on which to pursue the charges. Thus, 
the purpose served by the additional safeguard of dismissal with prejudice is 
essentially served in this case, permitting appellate review. See id. at 528-29,531-32 
(permitting appellate review of suppression orders despite fact that dismissal was 
not with prejudice). 
The fourth charge, driving on a revoked license, is a misdemeanor that cannot 
be re-filed in the district court but must be pursued in justice court with the use of 
additional evidence establishing that Defendant's license was, in fact, revoked on 
November 8, 2008. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-7-106(l) (West Supp. 2010). Such a 
refilling, however, is not the sort of "prosecutorial manipulation'' Troyer sought to 
prevent.3 866 P.2d at 531. 
3
 Assuming, arguendo, that Troyer applies and the ability to refile the 
misdemeanor charge prevents appellate review, this Court should dismiss this 
appeal for lack of a final appealable order, thereby permitting the State to seek entry 
of a new order of dismissal with prejudice from which to file a new appeal. See 
Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT 97,111,37 P.3d 1070 (absent a final appealable order, this 
Court lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal); Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. 
Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569,570 (Utah App. 1989) ("When a matter is outside the court's 
jurisdiction, it retains only the authority to dismiss the action."). 
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II. 
TROOPER RAWLINSON POSSESSED REASONABLE 
SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING ON A 
SUSPENDED LICENSE, THEREBY JUSTIFYING DEPUTY 
STEWART'S STOP OF DEFENDANTS CAR 
The lower court granted Defendant's suppression motion because it 
determined that the arresting officer, Deputy Stewart, lacked reasonable suspicion 
to support the stop. R. 142:33-35. The court determined that the stop was based 
solely on Trooper Rawlinson's statement that Defendant's license was suspended, 
and held that this statement was "not even close" to establishing reasonable 
suspicion to justify the stop because it lacked sufficient detail to explain the basis for 
the trooper's belief. R. 142:34-35. The court also determined that reasonable 
suspicion could have derived from verification by dispatch that the license was in 
fact revoked at that time, but no such verification was given. R. 142:34. Finally, the 
court concluded that Stewart himself lacked reasonable suspicion of his own, having 
stopped Defendant before he independently observed any driving violation. Id. 
This Court should reverse the lower court's suppression ruling because it 
rests on an erroneous interpretation of the law. The validity of the stop does not rest 
on whether Deputy Stewart had reasonable suspicion that Defendant was driving 
on a revoked license, but on whether Trooper Rawlinson, as the 'Taw enforcement 
source[]" of the information on which Deputy Stewart relied, possessed reasonable 
15 
suspicion. See State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274,1276-77 (Utah App. 1994). Under the 
circumstances at hand, this Court should find that he did. 
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit "'all searches and seizures, but 
[only] unreasonable searches and seizures/" State v. Lafond, 2003 UT App 101, Tf 11, 
68 R3d 1043 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)) (additional quotations 
omitted), cert, denied, 72 R3d 685 (Utah 2003). It is well-established that officers are 
permitted to conduct brief investigatory stops where there is "reasonable suspicion 
to believe that criminal activity may be afoot." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 
273 (2002) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Investigatory stops are not 
limited to ongoing or prospective crimes, but can also be based on reasonable 
suspicion that the suspect "has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal 
activity." State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, f 10,112 P.3d 507 (internal citation and 
quotation omitted). 
"In order to justify such a detention, the officer's suspicion must be supported 
by 'specific and articulable facts and rational inferences.'" Id. (citation omitted). "A 
determination that reasonable suspicion exists... need not rule out the possibility of 
innocent conduct." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277. "This is because the public interest in 
investigating criminal activity is sufficiently important to justify the minimal 
intrusion into personal security that such investigatory detentions entail." Markland, 
2005 UT 26,117 (citing to Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273). Thus, even when all aspects of a 
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defendant's conduct are "susceptible of innocent explanation/' a court still may 
properly conclude that the officers had a "particularized and objective basis'7 for 
suspecting legal wrongdoing. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277-78. In assessing whether they 
possess reasonable suspicion, officers are allowed to "draw on their own experience 
and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the 
cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained 
person." Id. at 273. (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
This Court in State v. Case recognized that while an investigating officer's own 
observations and inferences generally give rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion, 
"[a]n investigative stop may survive the Fourth Amendment prohibition of 
unreasonable searches and seizures if performed by an officer who objectively relies 
on information, bulletins, or flyers received from other law enforcement sources." 
884 P.2d 1274,1276-77 (Utah App. 1994) (first emphasis in original); see also United 
States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221,232 (1985); accord State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 650-51 
(Utah 1989) (stop was justified when made by officers objectively relying on 
broadcast issued by other officers possessing reasonable suspicion that the vehicle's 
occupants had robbed a store). In such a case, the validity of the stop "does not turn 
on whether those relying on the [information] were themselves aware of the specific 
facts which led their colleague[] to seek their assistance." Hensley, 469 U.S. at 221. 
Instead, the validity of the stop rests on whether the officer "'who issued the 
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[information] possessed a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop/7' Case, 884 P.2d at 
1277 (quoting Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232 (emphasis in original)); see also State v. Roybal, 
2010 UT 34, \ 14,232 P.3d 1016; Salt Lake City v. Bench, 2008 UT App 30,18,177 P.3d 
655, cert denied, 199 P.3d 367 (Utah 2008). "[T]he legality of a stop based on 
information imparted by another will depend on the sufficiency of the articulable 
facts known to the individual originating the information... subsequently received 
and acted upon by the investigating officer." Case, 884 P.2d at 1277-78 (citing 
Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232) (emphasis in original) (stop unlawful absent reasonable 
suspicion supporting dispatch on which investigating officer relied); State v. Seel, 
827 P.2d 954,960 (Utah App. 1992) (officer broadcasting message on which arresting 
officer relied in stopping defendants had reasonable suspicion that defendants had 
committed multiple burglaries, justifying stop), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 
1992); see also Roybal, 2010 UT 34, f f 20-22 (stop justified where dispatcher 
possessed reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving while intoxicated, 
permitting pursuit and stop by another officer in reliance on dispatch); Bruce, 779 
P.2d at 650-51 (police officers justifiably stopped defendant's vehicle in reliance on a 
broadcast from investigating officers who possessed reasonable suspicion that 
defendant had just robbed a store). 
Moreover, the acting officer need not " actually be informed of the facts 
known to the originating source" before acting on the information, but "may take 
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[the information] at face value and act on it forthwith/7 Case, 884 P.2d at 1277 n.5 
(citing Hensley, 469 U.S. at 231); see also Kaysville v. Mulcahy, III, 943 P.2d 231, 234 
(Utah App. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Saddler, 104 P.3d 1265 (Utah 
2004). If the legality of the stop is thereafter challenged, "the State becomes 
obligated, albeit after the fact, to show that legally sufficient articulable suspicion 
prompted issuance" of the original information. Case, 884 P.2d at 1277 n.5; see also 
Bench, 2008 UT App 30, \ 8; Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 234. This approach acts to 
minimize any intrusion on police methods that would hamper prompt investigation 
of reported criminal activity "[i]n an era when criminal suspects are increasingly 
mobile and increasingly likely to flee across jurisdictional boundaries[.]" Hensley, 
469 U.S. at 231. 
In this case, Deputy Stewart received information directly from a fellow 
officer and relied solely on that information to stop Defendant. That information 
included accurately identifying a specific individual by name and by sight, 
indicating that she was behind the wheel of a moving car in view of both officers at 
the time, and stating that her driver's license was revoked, suggesting that she was 
in the process of committing a crime. R. 142:12-14,17,22-24. The lower court held 
that this information was "not even close" to being enough to provide Deputy 
Stewart with the necessary reasonable suspicion. R. 142:36. Trooper Rawlinson, the 
judge noted, needed to provide "further information" concerning the basis for his 
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belief that Defendant's license had been revoked before Deputy Stewart would have 
sufficient reasonable suspicion to warrant a stop. R. 142:35. 
However, under these circumstances, Deputy Stewart need not himself be 
aware of the articulable facts underlying Trooper Rawlinson's information. Because 
he was objectively relying on "information . . . received from other law enforcement 
sources[,]" he was entitled to "take [the information] at face value and act on it 
forthwith." Case, 884 P.2d at 1274,1276-77 & n.5 (citing Hensley, 469 U.S. at 231) 
(emphasis added); see also Hensley, 469 U.S. at 231-32. The validity of the stop 
thereafter would depend on whether Trooper Rawlinson, who originated the 
information upon which Deputy Stewart acted, possessed reasonable suspicion that 
Defendant was driving on a suspended license, thereby justifying the stop. See Case 
884 P.2d at 1277-78 (citing Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232); see also Roybal, 2010 UT 34, f 15;. 
State v. Van Dyke, 2009 UT App 369, f 22, 223 P.3d 465, cert denied 230 P.3d 127 
(Utah 2010); Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 234-35. This Court should hold that he did. 
The lower court implied that Trooper Rawlinson independently possessed 
reasonable suspicion when it declared that Deputy Stewart's stop of Defendant 
would have been justified if Trooper Rawlinson had provided him with the 
information on which he based his belief that Defendant was driving on a revoked 
license. R. 142:35. In any event, a review of the totality of the circumstances 
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demonstrates that Trooper Rawlinson in fact possessed reasonable suspicion that 
Defendant was driving on a revoked license. 
Trooper Rawlinson did not rely on what he was told about Defendant, but 
had a personal history of relevant interactions with Defendant to justify his belief 
that her license had been revoked. Almost two years prior to the present incident, 
Trooper Rawlinson had assisted in arresting Defendant for DUI. R. 142:7-8. 
"Shortly after that[,]" the trooper arrested her again for DUI. R. 142:8. At the time 
of the second arrest, he ran her driver's license number on his computer, resulting in 
a screen that displayed Defendant's photograph and the status of her license as 
being revoked until 2012. R. 142:10-11. 
In the following year, the trooper wrote Defendant two citations for driving 
on a revoked license. The first arose when she drove up to the gas pump next to 
where the off-duty trooper was filling up his car and proceeded to fill up her own 
car before driving off. R. 142:8-9. Trooper Robinson contacted dispatch to report 
the matter and to "run her name[,]" and dispatch confirmed that her license was still 
revoked. R. 142:12. When he returned to work, he discovered that no one had 
followed up on the incident. Id. He went to her house to issue a citation for driving 
on a revoked license and, while he was waiting at the front door, she drove up in 
her car, earning a second citation for the same offense. Id. 
21 
Consequently, in the two years prior to the instant offense, Trooper 
Rawlinson had no less than five encounters with Defendant relating to driving 
while intoxicated or with a revoked license. In the course of those encounters, he 
verified the revoked status of her driver's license at least twice through means 
regularly relied upon by police officers. 
Finally, just days preceding the instant matter, the trooper again checked 
Defendant's licensing status, this time on one of the computers at the Driver's 
License Division, and reconfirmed that her license was revoked. R. 142:14-15. It 
was with this background and knowledge that Trooper Rawlinson advised Deputy 
Stewart in early November 2008 that the person behind the wheel of a car driving 
past them was Patricia Houston and that her license had been revoked because of 
alcohol. R. 142:7-14. Such personal experience and observations were more than 
sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. See Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 237 ("'An 
informant who has personally observed incriminating behavior has a stronger basis 
of knowledge than does an informant who relates not what he knows personally, 
but what he has heard others say/") (quoting State v. Melanson, 140 N.H. 199, 665 
A.2d 338, 340 (1995) (citation omitted)). 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Gibson is dispositive. See State 
v. Gibson, 665 P.2d 1302,1304-05 (Utah 1983). In that case, a trooper arrested Gibson 
for DUI, resulting in revocation of Gibson's license. See id. Almost nine months 
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after the arrest, and nearly four months after last checking to see that the license was 
revoked, the trooper saw Gibson drive by him as the trooper was talking to a fellow 
officer. See id. at 1303. The trooper stopped Gibson because he suspected that the 
license was still revoked. Id. Gibson confirmed as much when he was stopped, and 
the trooper arrested him. Id. Gibson ultimately moved to suppress all the evidence 
obtained as a result of his arrest, arguing that the trooper lacked an objective basis 
on which to stop him. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the 
suppression motion, holding that the arresting trooper's prior personal contact with 
Gibson amounted to articulable and reasonable suspicion that Gibson was driving 
on a revoked license. See id. at 104-05. 
Here, the lower court voiced concern for the possibility that " something" 
might have occurred to cause an early reinstatement of Defendant's license. R. 
142:34. However, Trooper Rawlinson had discovered that the revocation was to last 
until 2012 and repeatedly confirmed that the license was still revoked. R. 142:7-8, 
10-12,14-15. Trooper Rawlinson also verified the continued revocation a mere days 
prior to the instant offense. R. 142:14-15. It would be reasonable for the trooper to 
infer that Defendant's second DUI arrest and her two subsequent driving-related 
citations had done nothing to shorten the revocation period, but had likely 
prolonged it. Hence, the trooper's extended personal experience with Defendant 
and his repeated checks on her license with consistent outcomes provided him with 
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reasonable suspicion that Defendant was driving on a revoked license. See Gibson, 
665 P.2d at 1304-05. Indeed, Trooper Rawlinson's experience with Defendant was 
much more extensive than was the officer experience with Gibson. Moreover, the 
officer in Gibson stopped the driver based on revocation information obtained four 
months earlier. See id. at 1303. In this case, Defendant was stopped just days after 
Trooper Rawlinson reconfirmed that her license was revoked. R. 142:14-15. 
Accordingly, Deputy Stewart was entitled to rely on Trooper Rawlinson's 
information to stop Defendant, and Defendant's suppression motion should have 
been denied. See id, (finding reasonable suspicion from officer's prior encounters 
with defendant); see also Roybal, 2010 UT 34, f If 23-24 (upholding DUI stop made in 
reliance on information from dispatch where dispatcher had reasonable suspicion of 
DUI based on call from defendant's girlfriend). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reinstate the charges and reverse 
the suppression of the State's evidence arising from the stop of Defendant. 
Respectfully submitted October 7, 2010. 
MARKL. SH^RTLEFF. 
Utah AttermevjGeneral 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
U.S. CONSTITUTION, AMEND. IV 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18A-1 (WEST SUPftlfWJ 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV 
Amendment IV. Search and seizure 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l (West Supp. 2009) 
§ 77-18a- l . Appeals—When proper 
(1) A defendant may, as a matter of right, appeal from: 
(a) a final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea; 
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of the defendant; 
(c) an order adjudicating the defendant's competency to proceed further in a pending 
prosecution; or 
(d) an order d e l i n g bail, as provided in Subsection 77-20-1(7). 
(2) In addition to any appeal permitted by Subsection (1), a defendant may seek discretion-
ary appellate review of any interlocutory order. 
(3) The prosecution may, as a matter of right, appeal from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony information following a 
refusal to bind the defendant over for trial; 
(b) a pretrial order dismissing a charge on the ground that the court's suppression of 
evidence has substantially impaired the prosecution's case; 
(c) an order granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest: 
(d) an order arresting judgment or granting a motion for merger; 
(e) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double jeopardy or 
denial of a speedy trial; 
(f) an order granting a new trial; 
(g) an order holding a statute or any part of it invalid; 
(h) an order adjudicating the defendant's competency to proceed further in a pending 
prosecution; 
(i) an order finding, pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 19, Part 2, Competency for Execution, 
that an inmate sentenced to death is incompetent to be executed; 
(j) an order reducing the degree of offense pursuant to Section 76-3-402; or 
(k) an illegal sentence. 
(4) In addition to any appeal permitted by Subsection (3), the prosecution may seek 
discretionary appellate review of any interlocutory order entered before jeopardy attaches. 
Laws 1990, c. 7, § 10; Laws 1995, c 65, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 364, § 1, eff. May 5, 1997; 
Laws 2003, c. 11, § 10, eff. March 15, 2003; Laws 2004, c. 137, § 1, eff. May 3, 2004; Laws 2005, c. 106, 
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1 - police to police- So clearly, that's the information -
2 that's the flyer that was given, and Rovbal says that, 
3 "Officers can rely on other sources of information, including 
4 bulletins or flyers received from other law enforcement." 
5 That's exactly what we have here. "So long as the police who 
6 issued the flyer or bulletin possess reasonable suspicion to 
7 justify the stop." And with Trooper Rawlinson, obviously he 
8 had reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. I would submit 
9 that he had probable cause, if not actual knowledge that she 
10 was driving on a suspended license because of his previous 
11 interactions with Ms. Houston. 
12 Deputy Stewart - and I'm not saying that that was 
13 communicated to Deputy Stewart, but that didn't need to be 
14 communicated to Deputy Stewart according the Case law. What 
15 was communicated is that it was Patricia Houston; that her 
16 license was revoked, and that she was alcohol restricted. 
17 Based upon that information Deputy Stewart's suspicion was 
18 reasonable. I don't have any further argument. 
19 THE COURT: All right. On the defendant's motion to 
20 suppress based on the allegation there's no reasonable 
21 suspicion for the arresting officer, Deputy Stewart, to have 
22 I pulled over Ms. Houston in the first place, I'm granting that 
23 motion to suppress. There was no reasonable suspicion held by 
24 Deputy Stewart, the arresting officer, at the time he pulled 
25 Ms. Houston over. 
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1 I agree with the State that the information from 
2 the highway patrolman is not the same as a citizen because 
3 certainly he has more knowledge and information than a 
4 citizen, but this is the very reason why we have these rules. 
5 We can't have officers just telling people - telling other 
6 officers to pull other people over because they think they 
7 have something. It may be that there was a computer glitch. 
8 It may be that her license was reinstated. Then there's a 
9 lot of things that could have happened. These rules prevent 
10 that kind of abuse. Now, I'm not saying that there was abuse 
11 here or that that was the intent at all. These officers are 
12 trying to do their job, but simply you have to have 
13 something. 
14 Let me take a minute just to help the officers, at 
15 least in my perspective, understand. Deputy Stewart should 
16 have called into dispatch. That would have solved all of 
17 this. I don't - there's some evidence that he did and he 
18 didn't talk about it here today. But if he would have had 
19 confirmation from dispatch that a license was revoked and 
20 that this person was doing it, that - we wouldn't be here. 
21 | This wouldn't be an issue. 
22 So follow her around, follow her to her house, 
23 whatever he had to do until you get that confirmation or 
2 4 until you see a driving violation, then you have reasonable 
25 suspicion to pull them over. But until then, just another 
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1 officer saying, "Hey, go pull her over. She's driving on a 
2 suspended license," that just doesn't rise to the level. 
3 Now, if you had received further information from 
4 Trooper Rawlinson such as I was down at the Driver's License 
5 Division a few days ago and I looked at the computer screen 
6 and I saw all this stuff, if he articulated that to you then 
7 that certainly rises to the level. 
8 I know this is difficult to understand sometimes, 
9 we litigate about this stuff all the time, so it's no clear 
10 bright line rule and it's difficult for you guys as your 
11 sitting out there making quick decisions as to how to do it. 
12 But in this particular case, there just was no reasonable 
13 suspicion to pull her over. 
14 Let me give you another example. Lots of times a 
15 CI will come to other cops and say, "Hey, listen, I was at 
16 this party the other night, they were smoking pot.'7 And this 
17 is a reliable CI. I see these in search warrants all the 
18 time. Those officers will still go and do something to verify 
19 that information. They'll go and pull the trash and they'll 
20 verify that those people live there. They'll look for 
21 discarded, you know, baggies of marijuana, whatever ir is. 
22 I They'll do something. Or they'll sit and watch the house and 
23 see if there's a lot of activity coming to the house. 
24 Something to verify what the CI has told them before they get 
25 on the [inaudible] and get a warrant. 
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1 I know that a stop is different than a PC but the 
2 principles are the same. You're trying to find something 
3 I where you come in here and articulate, if you have something 
4 like this. Lots of times it's best just to think, Well, 
5 okay, if there's a defense attorney out there that's going t 
6 try to get me on this - and I don't mean get you - but call 
7 me on this and make sure it's right, what am I going to say 
8 in court? How am I going to articulate what I saw; what I 
9 witnesses; what I was able to come back here in court and 
10 tell the judge, this is why I -pulled them over? And a short 
11 statement, she has a revoked license and you wanted to stop 
12 her is not even close to that level. Essentially the - you 
13 have to have more than just a statement. You have to have 
14 more than that. 
15 Now, having said that, just housekeeping. I don't 
16 know much about you or about your cases other than what I've 
17 heard in this case here, but it's obvious you have a serious 
18 problem. You are being - they can chose how they want to 
19 proceed from here but I don't see how they can proceed 
20 without the information from the stop. 
21 I'm begging you, just - you're going to hurt 
22 yourself or you're going to hurt somebody else. (Inaudible). 
2 3 Mr. McAdams? 
24 MR. MCADAMS: At this time the State moves to 
25 dismiss without prejudice, Your Honor. 
1 THE COURT: All right. So with that the court is in 
2 recess. 
3 I MR. BUNDERSON: And dismissed. The record will show 
4 the case is dismissed? 
5 THE COURT: Yes. 
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THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo— 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Patricia Salazar Houston., 
Defendant and Appellee, 
ORDER 
Case No. 20100246-CA 
This matter is before the court on Appellee Patricia 
Houston's motion for summary disposition based on lack of 
jurisdiction. Houston argues that the appeal should be dismissed 
because the dismissal order was not with prejudice and it did not' 
state the ground for dismissal. The State argues that the 
current statute superceded the requirements argued by Houston. 
Because it appears that the issue presented is a matter of first 
impression, it is not amenable to summary disposition. The 
parties should anticipate briefing this issue more completely on 
full briefing. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Houston's motion for summary 
disposition is denied, and a ruling on the issues raised therein 
is deferred pending plenary presentation and consideration of the 
case. 
Dated this JM ih day of May, 2 010 
FOR THE COURT: 
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